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DANGEROUS TERRAIN: MAPPING THE
FEMALE BODY IN GONZALES V. CARHART
B. JESSIE HILL*
The body occupies an ambiguous position within the law. It is, in
one sense, the quintessential object of state regulatory and police power.1
The body is the object that the state acts both upon and for; the body of the
individual may, indeed, be subject to regulation and even physical intrusion
in the name of the state’s power and duty to protect the health and safety of
the “body politic.”2 At the same time, the body is often constructed3 in legal
discourse as the site of personhood—our most intimate, sacred, and
inviolate possession—implying that it is in some sense beyond the reach of
the law.4
* Associate Professor and Associate Director of the Center for Social Justice, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank the editors of the
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law for the opportunity to participate in this symposium.
Alix Thompson provided excellent research assistance. All errors, of course, are mine.
1

See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1605
(1986) (“[T]he normative world building which constitutes ‘Law’ is never just a mental or
spiritual act. A legal world is built only to the extent that there are commitments that place
bodies on the line. . . . [T]he interpretive commitments of officials are realized, indeed, in the
flesh.”); Carl F. Stychin, Body Talk: Rethinking Autonomy, Commodification and the
Embodied Legal Self, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH CARE LAW 211, 214–15 (Sally
Sheldon & Michael Thomson eds., 1998) (explaining that “in order for the law to function at
all it must first and foremost have a hold over bodies”) (quoting PHENG CHEAH, ET AL.,
THINKING THROUGH THE BODY OF LAW xv (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2

See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughterhouse to Lochner: The Rise and Fall
of the Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 476, 494–96 (1996)
(discussing the constitutionality of mandatory vaccination).
3

The term “constructed” is used advisedly here, with the intention of drawing on a
large body of critical theory that conceives of various types of discourse, including legal
discourse, as rhetorically creating a particular reality as much as it describes that reality. It
suggests, moreover, that there is nothing natural or inevitable about how discourses such as
legal discourse talk about bodies. See generally ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 3–4 (1997)
(describing the act of discursively constructing the body in law); cf. Stychin, supra note 1, at
213 (noting that bodies “have been culturally ‘produced’ by discourses such as law in
different ways”).
4

HYDE, supra note 3, at 89–90; Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The
Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 198–201 (1995).
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The inherent tension between these two concepts of the body
permeates the law, but it is perhaps nowhere more prominent than in the
constitutional doctrine pertaining to abortion. Abortion is one of the most
heavily regulated medical procedures in the United States, and yet it is at
the same time the subject of relatively robust constitutional privacy
protections—often even treated as synonymous with the word “privacy”
itself.5
This brief Article focuses on the rhetoric of the body in abortion
law and more specifically on how the Supreme Court’s language constructs
the female body in the recent case of Gonzales v. Carhart,6 which upheld
the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act (“PBABA”)7 against a
constitutional challenge.8 A number of commentators have already
remarked on the troubling rhetoric employed by Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in that case, primarily because of its paternalistic and sentimental
view of motherhood.9 But the focus of this Article is on the often
overlooked, yet equally striking, language of the Court’s opinion that
graphically describes and details the regulated abortion procedure itself.
Part I of this Article briefly explains the background of Gonzales,
describing both the “partial-birth” abortion law at issue in that case and the
relevant constitutional doctrine. Part II then delves into the language of the
opinion, with a particular emphasis on the technical portions of the Court’s
opinion detailing the abortion procedure and explaining how that procedure
is regulated by the challenged law. Part II draws from that rhetoric several
themes: disappearance, dismemberment, and displacement of borders.
These themes intertwine to construct the female body as a sort of
geographical space, a dangerous terrain that not only permits but also
requires regulation. Although these themes in part reflect the insights of
many other feminist scholars and the motifs that they, too, have uncovered
in abortion regulation and rhetoric, this Article contends that Gonzales
5

See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV.
715, 739–41 (2010) (noting that in political discourse, the “right to privacy” is basically
synonymous with the right to choose abortion).
6

550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Carhart II). This Article will also discuss the Supreme
Court’s earlier “partial-birth” abortion case, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
(Carhart I), but the emphasis will be on the unusual rhetoric of the more recent (and
therefore probably more important) case.
7

18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a) (West 2010).

8

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 168.

9

See infra note 29 and sources cited therein.
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represents a uniquely literal and uniquely visual representation of those
concepts. Indeed, this Article argues that the notions of disappearance,
dismemberment, and displacement of borders are united by their association
with this case’s uniquely graphic—that is to say visual—approach. Part III
concludes with some brief reflections on the meaning of the Court’s
language in the context of abortion law in general.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE AND DOCTRINAL BACKDROP
In Gonzales v. Carhart, a 5–4 decision written by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 against constitutional challenge.10 The federal PBABA
imposes criminal and civil penalties—including up to two years’
imprisonment—on any physician performing a particular abortion
procedure.11 The regulated procedure is known medically as “dilation and
extraction,” “D&X,” “intact dilation and evacuation,” or “intact D&E,” but
is often referred to, in more politically charged terms, as “partial-birth
abortion.”12 That procedure is defined in the Act as:
deliberately and intentionally vaginally deliver[ing] a living fetus
until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head
is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech
presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside
the body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act
that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus;
and . . . perform[ing] the overt act, other than completion of
delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus.13

Because the procedure may be used as early as sixteen weeks’
gestation, the ban thus has both pre-viability and post-viability
10

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 168.

11

Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act,18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531(a), 1531(c) (2009). In order
to be covered by the PBABA, the abortion must be one “in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a) (West 2010).
12

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 136–37; Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp.
2d 436, 440 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Gail Glidewell, Note, “Partial Birth” Abortion and the
Health Exception: Protecting Maternal Health or Risking Abortion on Demand?, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1095 (2001) (explaining the politically charged nature of the term
“partial-birth abortion”).
13

18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2010).
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application.14 Importantly, numerous medical authorities confirm—though
the Government disputed—that the procedure is safer than the available
alternatives for women with certain medical or physiological conditions.15
The plaintiffs had challenged the law on several grounds, but the
Gonzales Court considered only three alleged flaws. First, the law lacked an
exception allowing the procedure to be performed where necessary to
preserve the health of the woman; second, it was void for vagueness in its
description of the regulated procedure; and third, it imposed an undue
burden on the abortion right because it was written so broadly as to sweep
within its prohibition the most common second-trimester abortion
procedure, known simply as dilation and evacuation (D&E).16 The Court
rejected all of those claims, at least insofar as they were presented in the
context of a facial challenge, and kept the federal ban in place.17
In doing so, however, the Court was not writing on a blank slate.
The Supreme Court had already resolved nearly identical questions, in a
nearly identical case, quite differently seven years earlier. In Stenberg v.
Carhart, by a 5–4 vote (with Justice Kennedy in dissent), the Court had
held Nebraska’s “partial-birth abortion” law unconstitutional due to the
overbroad language of its prohibition and its lack of a health exception.18
When the Nebraska ban fell, so did numerous other states’ laws by
implication, as they, too, contained one or both of those flaws.19 The federal
law was thus in some sense a response to the Court’s holding in Stenberg,
though not exclusively motivated by that opinion.20 Congress had passed
similar bills in 1996 and 1997, but they were met with vetoes by President
Clinton.21 Perhaps enraged by the Court’s holding in Stenberg, but also
likely emboldened by the election of Republican President George W.
14

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 927 (2000) (Carhart I).

15

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 162–63; Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 936.

16

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 143–45; see generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality op.) (holding that an abortion regulation is
unconstitutional if it imposes an undue burden on the exercise of the abortion right).
17

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 167–68.

18

Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 937–38.

19

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 140 (citing Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 995–96 & nn. 12–13
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
20

Id. at 141.

21

Id. at 140–41.
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Bush, who had stated his support for the law during the presidential
campaign,22 as well as by the likelihood—soon come to fruition—that that
President would have the opportunity to appoint at least one Supreme Court
Justice,23 Congress tried again and finally succeeded in passing a federal
“partial-birth” abortion ban in 2003.24 That ban contained more precise
language describing the forbidden procedure than the unconstitutional
Nebraska ban. But rather than including a health exception and thereby
fully complying with the Supreme Court’s holding in Stenberg, Congress
included a long list of “findings” purporting to demonstrate that the health
exception was not needed. 25
Given this background, commentators have remarked upon the
apparent inconsistencies in the Supreme Court’s decision in the second
“partial-birth” abortion case.26 First, despite the Supreme Court’s clear
holding in Stenberg that the ban was unconstitutional without a health
exception, Congress did not include a health exception in the 2003 Act. The
Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the Act in Gonzales without explicitly
overruling Stenberg.27 Second, despite the fact that the Court had struck the
statute on its face in Stenberg, it asserted the inappropriateness of a facial

22

Glidewell, supra note 12, at 1089.

23

In 2006, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor retired. Her vote had been critical in
striking down the Nebraska ban in Stenberg v. Carhart, and her replacement Samuel Alito
was widely understood to be more likely to vote to uphold the federal PBABA. See, e.g.,
Supreme Court Considers Federal Ban on Disputed Abortion Procedure, USA TODAY, Nov.
8, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2006-11-08scoturs-abortion_x.htm.
24

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 141. For a useful overview of the history and background
of the federal PBABA, see David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the
Future of Abortion Law, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2–5.
25

Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 108th Cong., Pub. L. No. 108-105 at *2

(2006).
26

See, e.g., Caitlin Borgmann, Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous Legislative
Appeals to Science in the Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 26–27 (2008); B. Jessie
Hill, A Radically Immodest Judicial Modesty: The End of Facial Challenges to Abortion
Regulations and the Future of the Health Exception in the Roberts Era, 59 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010); Maya Manian, Rights, Remedies, and Facial Challenges, 36
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 611, 616 (2009).
27

See Manian, supra note 26, at 616.
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challenge in the nearly identical later case without convincingly
distinguishing Stenberg.28
In addition, commentators have remarked upon Justice Kennedy’s
rhetoric. In particular, many scholars were troubled by the passage in which
Justice Kennedy invoked the “bond of love the mother has for her child” as
a basis for concluding that some women are likely to regret their abortion
decision.29 According to the Court, this potential for regret in turn justifies
protecting women from their choice to terminate a pregnancy, since:
[i]t is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow
more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she
once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull
and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child
assuming the human form.30

As Justice Ginsburg rightly points out in her Gonzales dissent, this
language draws on archaic and discredited stereotypes about women’s roles
in society—casting the woman as a “mother” who will, almost by nature,
regret the decision to reject a relationship with her “child.”31 It also raises
the question why Justice Kennedy did not—in light of his concerns about
women’s lack of knowledge about the intact D&E procedure—advocate
“requir[ing] doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the
different procedures and their attendant risks” rather than “depriv[ing]
women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of
their safety.”32
The paternalistic and romanticized sentiment conveyed by Justice
Kennedy’s flowery language is no doubt troubling for its implications
regarding his, and the Court’s, attitude toward the meaning of the abortion
28

See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts
Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 778 (2009).
29
Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159. For critical commentary on this language, see, for
example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 423, 426 (2007);
Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 254–62 (2009); and Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality
Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Expression, 56
EMORY L.J. 815, 837–38 (2007).
30

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159–60.

31

Id. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

32

Id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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decision and the conditions under which it is often made.33 But there is
another aspect of this language that is striking—namely, the way it invokes,
amid its linguistic flourishes, the image of the “doctor . . . pierc[ing] the
skull and vacuum[ing] the fast-developing brain of [the] unborn child” who,
like an actual child, “assume[s] the human form.” This graphic—indeed,
horrifying—image of a “child” having its brain suctioned out while the
unknowing mother absently permits this crime to occur echoes the Court’s
earlier description of the intact D&E procedure itself. The Court’s language
in the “bond of love” passage almost obsessively repeats and re-enacts the
earlier description using the same graphic, almost voyeuristic style. It is to
that earlier description that this Article now turns.
II. DISAPPEARANCE, DISMEMBERMENT, AND
DISPLACEMENT OF BOUNDARIES: THE COURT’S
RHETORIC IN GONZALES V. CARHART
The graphically explicit, at times even gory, language of the socalled “partial-birth abortion” cases is challenging for both readers and
scholars. Even the most pro-choice of readers may find themselves wanting
to avert their eyes from the page. Indeed, the Court, in both cases, issued
perfunctory apologies for the necessity of its graphic detail: in Stenberg, the
Court asserted that it “must describe and then discuss several different
abortion procedures.”34 Acknowledging that its “discussion may seem
clinically cold or callous to some, perhaps horrifying to others,” the Court
nonetheless regretfully explained that “[t]here is no alternative way . . . to
acquaint the reader with the technical distinctions among different abortion
methods and related factual matters, upon which the outcome of this case
depends.”35 The “technical detail” in which the Court discusses the abortion
procedures is thus unavoidable and required by the nature of the case
itself.36 The Gonzales Court’s apology was briefer, incorporating by
33

See, e.g., David A. Grimes, The Continuing Need for Late Abortion, 280 JAMA
747, 748–49 (1998) (discussing the reasons, such as serious maternal illness or severe fetal
anomalies, why abortions are sometimes performed after twenty-one weeks’ gestation).
34

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923 (2000) (Carhart I).

35

Id.

36
Id. It perhaps bears noting, however, that the Court has previously considered a
challenge to a ban on a method of abortion without finding it necessary to describe the
procedure in graphic detail. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75–
79 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a ban on the saline amniocentesis method of abortion).
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reference its earlier excuse: “The Act proscribes a particular manner of
ending fetal life, so it is necessary here, as it was in Stenberg, to discuss
abortion procedures in some detail.”37 Yet it is possible that there is
something more to this language than mere necessity. Drawing on that
intuition, this Part engages in a close reading of Gonzales’ description of
the prohibited abortion act itself.
The description of intact D&E itself, after the preliminary apology
for what follows and some verbal hemming and hawing about the proper
terminology, occupies approximately three pages of the U.S. reporter.38
Immediately preceding this relatively lengthy medical exposition are very
brief descriptions of the most common first-trimester procedures: one
sentence each is spent explaining vacuum aspiration and medical abortion,
and a lengthier (almost two pages) description of dilation and evacuation.
Dilation and evacuation is the most common second-trimester abortion
method, which bears some resemblances to the intact D&E procedure, both
in terms of the nature of the procedure itself and the disturbing quality of
the Court’s depiction of it.39 After the Court’s medical description of intact
D&E, a short one-paragraph summary notes the less-commonly used
techniques of induction, hysterotomy, and hysterectomy.40
The Court’s language combines a highly technical delineation of
the procedure with emotionally evocative passages. The Court juxtaposes
medical terminology and quotations from scientific materials with far less
technical, more inflammatory language. For example, the Court quotes first
from physicians’ descriptions of how they perform the intact D&E. Thus,
the Court explains that “in an intact D&E procedure the doctor extracts the
fetus in a way conducive to pulling out its entire body,” rather than
removing it in parts, as in a standard D&E.41 Because breech positioning of
the fetus makes intact removal easier, the fetus may be rotated if it is not
already in that position; then “the fetus’ head lodges in the cervix, and

Like the PBABA, the ban at issue in Danforth was challenged on the ground that it
threatened maternal health; it was not challenged on the ground that the law’s description of
the banned procedure was vague or overbroad, however. Id.
37

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 134 (2007) (Carhart II).

38

Id. at 137–40.

39

Id. at 135–36.

40

Id. at 140.

41

Id. at 137.
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dilation is insufficient to allow it to pass.”42 The Court then proceeds to
quote from one physician’s clinical description, aimed at an audience of
practitioners, in which a detailed process is set forth for inserting a suction
tube into the fetus’s cranium, removing brain tissue, and collapsing the
skull to remove the fetus intact.43
The Court follows this highly technical discourse with a description
“from a nurse who witnessed the same method on a 26-1/2 week fetus and
who testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee.”44 The latter remarks
use the term “baby” throughout and describe “[t]he baby’s little fingers . . .
clasping and unclasping” and “his little feet . . . kicking,” until the doctor
“stuck the scissors in the back of his head,” causing it to “startle” or “flinch,
like a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall,” and then “sucked the
baby’s brains out” with a suction tube, causing “the baby” to go
“completely limp.”45 The doctor then “threw” the “baby,” placenta, and
instruments into a pan.46 The opinion then returns to a brief description of
technical variations on the described procedure, one in which the fetus’
cranial contents may not be entirely suctioned out, and one in which the
skull is separated from the body and removed separately. Moreover, the
opinion juxtaposes the medical language of “extract[ing] the fetus” with
“ripping it apart,” and the medical language of “disarticulat[ion]” with the
gory and evocative “decapitat[ion].”47 The juxtaposition and alternation of
the technical, jargon-filled medical discourse with this more emotional lay
discourse seems to give them equal descriptive status and power in the
Court’s opinion, as if each is struggling for control of the relevant narrative,

42

Id. at 137–38.

43
Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 138 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 108-58, at 3 (2003) (quoting
Martin Haskell, M.D., Dilation and Extraction for Late Second Trimester Abortions,
Presented at the National Abortion Federation Risk Management Seminar (September 13,
1992), in SECOND TRIMESTER ABORTION: FROM EVERY ANGLE 27, 30-31 (1992))).
44

Id. at 137–39.

45

Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 108-58, at 3 (2003)).

46

Id. Perhaps because they would have detracted from the persuasive force of the
witness’s words, the Court omitted the last two lines of the nurse’s testimony, in which she
claimed, “I saw the baby move in the pan. I asked another nurse, and she said it was just
reflexes. . . . That baby boy had the most perfect angelic face I think I have ever seen in my
life.” H.R. Rep. No. 108-58, at 3 (2003).
47

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 137, 139.
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or perhaps such that each reinforces the authority of the other.48 Moreover,
the coupling of different rhetorical styles in the Court’s description can be
viewed as a kind of repetition or duplication of the central act described in
the opinion, figured as a kind of murderous surgery, or a medicalized
murder. Indeed, this murder is repeated again and again throughout the
Court’s opinion—both in Justice Kennedy’s repeated references to it49 and,
as described below, in the Court’s description of the woman’s body, which
dismembers that body and causes it to disappear.
The foregoing account may be contrasted somewhat with that of
Stenberg v. Carhart, which, though also highly technical, occupies less than
two full pages and consists primarily of paraphrasing of testimony put on by
the plaintiffs and the descriptions of the procedure by the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”).50 The Stenberg Court
summarized the procedure dryly as follows:
[I]t begins with induced dilation of the cervix. The procedure
then involves removing the fetus from the uterus through the
cervix “intact.” . . . The intact D&E proceeds in one of two ways,
depending on the presentation of the fetus. If the fetus presents
head first (a vertex presentation), the doctor collapses the skull;
and the doctor then extracts the entire fetus through the cervix. If
the fetus presents feet first (a breech presentation), the doctor
pulls the fetal body through the cervix, collapses the skull, and
extracts the fetus through the cervix. The breech extraction
version of the intact D&E is also known commonly as “dilation
and extraction,” or D&X.51

The Stenberg Court then noted a slight variation on the procedure,
which requires the physician to convert the fetus to breech presentation in
all cases, and included the equally impersonal ACOG description of that

48
Cf. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in
the Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 266–67 (1987) (discussing the two
abortion texts—one scientific and one moral—that comprise the antiabortion film The Silent
Scream and suggesting that the medical aspects “both obscure[] and reinforce[] a coded set
of messages that work as political signs and moral injunctions”).
49

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 137–40, 159–60.

50

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 927–28 (2000) (Carhart I).

51
Id. at 927 (citations omitted) (quoting Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099,
1105 (D. Neb. 1998) (citing testimony of plaintiff and plaintiff’s expert)).
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version.52 Though less lengthy and less emotive than the Gonzales Court’s
opinion, the Stenberg Court’s description nonetheless again replicates its
simultaneously graphic and highly technical language.
There is something disturbing about this highly technical, highly
detailed description of the abortion procedure—perhaps more disturbing
than the emotional description, precisely because of its seemingly objective
cast. It calls to mind what Rosalind Petchesky has called a “panoptics of the
womb,” a space in which everything is visible and therefore subject to
regulation or management from an impersonal distance.53 The Court’s
excruciatingly detailed, step-by-step narrative of a medical procedure as it
unfolds inside the woman’s body possesses a uniquely visual, almost
photographic quality: it appears to be at once objective and objectifying. It
is a linguistic manifestation of the law’s extraordinary degree of regulation

52
In particular, the ACOG description includes the following four steps: “1.
deliberate dilatation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days; 2. instrumental
conversion of the fetus to a footling breech; 3. breech extraction of the body excepting the
head; and 4. partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal
delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus.” Id. at 928 (quoting American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists Executive Board, Statement on Intact Dilation and
Extraction (Jan. 12, 1997)).
53

Petchesky, supra note 48, at 277. The term “panoptics” comes from Michel
Foucault’s discussion of the panopticon, a prison design invented by Jeremy Bentham, in
which it is possible to observe each prisoner at all times without the prisoner knowing
whether she is being watched. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 200–03 (2d ed. 1995). Professor Petchesky was writing about the impact of fetal
ultrasound imaging on the political culture surrounding abortion—an issue which has as
much resonance today as in the 1980s, when her article was published. See, e.g., Carol
Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice,
56 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 351 (2008) (analyzing the recent spate of state laws requiring women to
view a fetal ultrasound before an abortion); see also infra text accompanying notes 111–115.
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and management of this one particular medical procedure.54 As discussed
below, it also serves to justify that intensive regulation.55
Yet despite the graphic and seemingly thorough quality of the
Court’s description, the woman herself barely makes an appearance: the
various methods of abortion are described as transactions that occur almost
exclusively between the “doctor” and the “fetus.” In approximately seven
pages of the United States Reports devoted to these descriptions in
Gonzales, the word “woman” appears only five times and only once in
connection with the intact D&E procedure itself.56 The words “fetal” and
“fetus,” by contrast, appear a total of forty-one times in those seven pages;
the word “doctor,” thirty-one times.57 Thus, the procedure “begins with
dilation of the cervix.”58 Then, “the doctor extracts the fetus in a way
conducive to pulling out its entire body.”59 The place whence the fetus is
extracted is not mentioned; the fetus, but not the woman, possesses a body
in the Court’s rhetoric. At several points, the fetus’s head is described as
being lodged in “the cervix,” but the fetus is never described as being

54

See, e.g., Joshua E. Perry, Partial Birth Biopolitics, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 247, 253 (2008) (“Abortion is the biopolitical example par excellence—‘a medical
procedure every aspect of which is heavily regulated.’”) (quoting John T. Parry, “Society
Must Be [Regulated]”: Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 853, 872 (2005)). It is, of course, particularly problematic that this
extensive apparatus of regulation is being deployed in a way that threatens women’s health
for the benefit of purported state interests in the highly general concept of “the dignity of
[unborn] human life” and “the effects on the medical community and on its reputation
caused by the practice of partial-birth abortion,” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157–58
(2007) (Carhart II), rather than in a way that promotes greater public and personal health
and safety, see Perry, supra at 256–57.
55

See infra text accompanying notes 68–100.

56
Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 134–40. Nor does the word “mother” appear at all in that
passage as a substitute for “woman.” The word “patient” appears twice: once in connection
with standard D&E, id. at 135 (noting that the amount of dilation during a D&E is not
uniform “and a doctor does not know in advance how an individual patient will respond”),
and once in a direct quote from a physician’s description of the procedure. Id. at 136 (“With
the catheter still in place, he applies traction to the fetus, removing it completely from the
patient.”).
57

Id. at 134–40.

58
Id. at 137 (emphasis added); see also id. at 137 (“[S]ome doctors . . . may
attempt to dilate the cervix to a greater degree.”).
59

Id.
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removed from the “woman’s body” or the “woman” herself. 60 Indeed, the
Court says only that the fetus “pass[es] through” or “is removed.”61 It is as
if the woman is a mere bystander or perhaps not present at all.62 The female
body is not so much a corporeal entity as a geographic space in which the
drama plays out between the fetus and the doctor.63
Yet, the Gonzales Court is not alone in erasing the woman from the
scene. Although the Court was substantially more solicitous of women’s
rights and health in Stenberg v. Carhart, and though the Court began its
opinion by speaking in general terms about women’s equality,64 the word
“woman” does not appear even one time in the Court’s similarly lengthy
description of abortion methods in that case. One might thus attribute the
60

Id. at 137–39.

61

Id. at 139, 140. The Court’s description in Gonzales may be contrasted with the
lower court’s description in Planned Parenthood Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957
(N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Carhart II). Though the district court’s opinion on the constitutionality
of the federal PBABA in that case occupied roughly eighty pages of the Federal Supplement,
the court spent only one page describing the procedure itself. Id. at 964. In that description,
the court explained that “the woman’s cervix is dilated . . . ; the physician inserts forceps into
the woman’s uterus [and possibly repositions the fetus]; the fetus is extracted intact through
the cervix and vagina until its head . . . is lodged at the cervical opening, or os; and . . .
drains brain tissue . . . to the point at which it [the fetal head] can be extracted from the
uterus.” Id. (emphasis added). The Planned Parenthood description thus contained more
personal language (“the woman’s cervix”; “the woman’s uterus”), while still including some
of the impersonal, detached language described above (“the cervix and vagina”; “the
uterus”).
62
Cf. Petchesky, supra note 48, at 277 (describing how fetal imaging transforms
the pregnant woman into “the ‘site’ of the fetus, a passive spectator in her own pregnancy”).
63

Other commentators have remarked on the disappearance of the woman, as well
as her configuration as a mere environment for the fetus, in reproductive law and rhetoric.
See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Dismembered Selves and Wandering Wombs, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 337, 348 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); Isabel
Karpin, Legislating the Female Body: Reproductive Technology and the Reconstructed
Woman, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 325, 327–28, 335, 343–47 (1992); Elizabeth Reilly, The
“Jurisprudence of Doubt”: How the Premises of the Supreme Court’s Abortion
Jurisprudence Undermine Procreative Liberty, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 757, 774–76 (1998); cf.
HYDE, supra note 3, at 83 (noting that in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), “the pregnant
woman involved in the case has, discursively, no body at all”); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the
Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1443–44 (1992) (explaining that constitutional
privacy doctrine fails to acknowledge the impact of laws “on the physical bodies of . . .
actual, empirical individuals”).
64

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920-21 (2000) (Carhart I).

14

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 19:3

disappearance of the woman to the Court’s adoption of medical discourse
rather than to conscious choice.65 Relatedly, the federal PBABA uses the
word “woman” only once, in one subsection, to clarify that “[a] woman
upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed may not be prosecuted
under this section, for a conspiracy to violate this section, or for an offense .
. . based on a violation of this section.”66 The “woman” is mentioned, in
other words, only to exclude her from the statute’s scope, as if the woman
herself is not really the object of regulation; the “mother,” on the other
hand, makes repeated appearances in the statutory language.67 Unlike the
Court’s descriptive language, then, the skewed rhetoric of the federal statute
seems to result from a conscious political choice.
Moreover, the drama being played out between doctor and fetus is
configured at the outset by the Court’s language as a brutal, criminal act—a
murder. The Court’s opinion, like the Act itself, repeatedly uses various
forms of the word “kill” to describe the doctor’s actions.68 In addition, the
Court embraces the PBABA’s term “overt act,” which may suggest the
criminal law of assault or conspiracy. Indeed, the reader cannot help but
notice as well that what is occurring is mayhem and dismemberment, a
“decapitati[on]” and “disarticulat[ion].”69 This mayhem echoes Justice
Thomas’s dissent in Stenberg, in which he worries that a doctor, in order to
circumvent the literal language of a “partial-birth” abortion prohibition that
is written too narrowly, may “plung[e] scissors into the fetus’ heart” in
order to cause the fetus to die before it is fully enough extracted from the
woman’s uterus, or “chop[] off two fetal toes prior to completing the
delivery” so that the State cannot argue “that the fetus was otherwise
intact.”70 Such vivid imagery is difficult to read, exceeding the degree of

65

Cf. EMILY MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY: A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF
REPRODUCTION 58–67 (1987) (analyzing how the woman is described in medical discourse
as largely passive in or irrelevant to the process of giving birth).
66

18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(e) (West 2010).

67

18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531(a), (b)(1)(A), (c)(1), (d)(1) (West 2010).

68

18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) (West 2010); Carhart II, 550 U.S.
at 136, 139, 140.
69

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 139 (2007) (Carhart II).

70

Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 1002 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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disturbing detail one is likely to find even in Supreme Court cases
describing actual crimes of violence.71
After the graphic description of a criminal act, in which the woman
herself is missing—she is just the frame, background, or terrain for this
intensive description of what actually occurs inside her—the Court moves
on to consider the “operation and effect” of the Act. Because the plaintiffs
have made claims of vagueness and overbreadth, the Court must then
decide which procedures are actually covered by the law. The Court’s
rhetoric here, too, is strange and troubling, re-invoking many of the
thematic elements just described.
First, the Court, again adopting the language of the Act, talks about
“partial-birth abortion” as a procedure in which the fetus is killed once it is
almost entirely “outside the body of the mother.”72 This language manifests
several themes that have appeared in existing feminist critiques of abortion
law and “pro-life” rhetoric. Most obviously, saying that the fetus is largely
“outside the body of the mother” grants the fetus a certain autonomy, as if it
has already been born.73 It also makes the woman unwillingly into a

71
Although the Author has not completed a comprehensive study of the language
used in such cases—and comparisons are difficult to make in any case—it appears that the
degree of gruesome detail in Supreme Court cases dealing with capital punishment, for
example, rarely if ever equals or exceeds that found in Gonzales. For example, in Uttecht v.
Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007), a death penalty case decided in the same Term as Gonzales,
Justice Stevens’s dissent reprimands the Court (whose opinion was written again by Justice
Kennedy) for “open[ing] its opinion with a graphic description of the underlying facts of
respondent’s crime, perhaps in an attempt to startle the reader or muster moral support for its
decision.” Id. at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Yet the actual language to which Justice Stevens
objects is as follows: “Respondent Cal Coburn Brown robbed, raped, tortured, and murdered
one woman in Washington. Two days later, he robbed, raped, tortured, and attempted to
murder a second woman in California.” Id. at 4–5. This language—which constitutes the full
extent of the Court’s description of the underlying crimes—is substantially less detailed and
visual than that of the Gonzales opinion. Justice Kennedy’s description of the underlying
crime and resulting injuries to the victim is somewhat more graphic, however, in Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646–47, 2648 (U.S. 2008), in which the Court held that the
death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed for the rape of a child alone, id. at 2650–
51.
72

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 148 (“[W]e agree, that if an abortion procedure does not
involve the delivery of a living fetus to one of these ‘anatomical “landmarks”‘—where,
depending on the presentation, either the fetal head or the fetal trunk past the navel is outside
the body of the mother—the prohibitions of the Act do not apply.”).
73

See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 63, at 347–48; Petchesky, supra note 48, at 270,
272; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Regulation of
Abortion and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 289–90, 325–27 (1992).
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“mother,” since she has in some sense already given birth.74 And it suggests
that what is occurring here is murder or infanticide rather than an abortion.
Indeed, this latter idea encapsulates precisely exactly what “partial-birth”
abortion ban proponents argue: that the procedure may be regulated because
it happens outside the woman’s body and therefore is more akin to
infanticide than abortion.75 Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Stenberg
had cited an American Medical Association fact sheet that suggests an
ethical distinction between intact D&E and regular D&E because in the
former procedure the fetus is “killed outside of the womb.”76
Perhaps even more importantly, though, the Court’s language is
also plainly inexact, and even inaccurate. The technical description of the
intact D&E abortion procedure has clearly indicated that the fetus must in
fact be partially outside the woman’s cervix, but not outside her “body.”77
Though the Court seems strangely loath to acknowledge it, there is,
technically, something between the woman’s cervix and the outside
world—namely, her vagina. And indeed, the Court’s opinion in Stenberg,
like the statute at issue in that case, had described the fetus not as being

74

Cf. Sally Sheldon, “Who Is the Mother to Make the Judgment?”: The
Constructions of Woman in English Abortion Law, 1 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 3, 9, 12–13, 15–
17 (1993) (describing various ways in which British abortion legislation assumes
motherhood to be woman’s normal role); Siegel, supra note 73, at 311–14, 327–28
(identifying the assumption of motherhood as women’s natural destiny in both the early antiabortion movement and popular contemporary anti-abortion arguments). Women are often
referred to as “mothers” in abortion cases. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64
(1973) (discussing the “State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother,”
the fetus’s “capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,” and the necessity of a
health exception “to preserve the life or health of the mother”).
75

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 143 (3d
Cir. 2000); see also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 620–21 (4th
Cir. 2005) (discussing a constitutional challenge to a state statute that outlawed “partial birth
infanticide,” defined as “any deliberate act that (i) is intended to kill a human infant who has
been born alive, but who has not been completely extracted or expelled from its mother, and
that (ii) does kill such infant, regardless of whether death occurs before or after extraction or
expulsion from its mother has been completed”).
76
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 963 (2000) (Carhart I) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). The fact sheet did not, however, suggest that the fetus is
killed outside the woman’s body. As discussed at greater length below, this particular elision
is peculiar to the PBABA and the Gonzales opinion.
77

See supra text accompanying notes 42, 58–60.
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outside the body but rather as being delivered “into the vagina” prior to fetal
demise.78
Several factors may explain the apparent linguistic confusion. First,
the Court is apparently adopting the language that Congress used in the
PBABA.79 Congress’s choice to describe the fetus as “outside the body of
the mother” in the PBABA was most likely a deliberate political choice, as
opposed to being motivated by a lack of anatomical familiarity. It is indeed
unsurprising that Congress would want to cast the fetus as autonomous.
Describing the fetus as outside the woman’s body and therefore practically
already born makes the procedure seem more like infanticide; thus,
Congress’s language was no doubt geared toward garnering political points,
rousing sympathy for the fetus, and making the courts more likely to uphold
the law. Second, the anatomical distances are, indeed, rather small in
absolute terms. Since there is not a large physical difference between a fetus
being “outside the body” and “outside the cervix,” perhaps the Court’s
language can be considered slightly imprecise rather than flatly incorrect.80
But surely these explanations are not entirely persuasive. The Supreme
Court, like most courts, is generally fairly attentive to the language it uses.
Particularly in this case, the Court has described the relevant abortion
procedure in excruciating detail, with an invasive and almost microscopic
degree of precision.81 And of course, there was no shortage of medical
information in the record.82 The subsequent imprecision regarding the
location of the cervix—this slippage in vocabulary—is therefore surprising.
78

Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 938–40 (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-326(9)
(LexisNexis 1999)); see also id. at 940 (“Both procedures [D&E and intact D&E] can
involve the introduction of a ‘substantial portion’ of a still living fetus, through the cervix,
into the vagina.”).
79

18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (West 2010).

80
According to one standard medical textbook, the length of the anterior vaginal
wall is usually between six and eight centimeters, and the posterior vaginal wall usually
varies in length between seven and ten centimeters. F. GARY CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., WILLIAMS
OBSTETRICS 17–18 (22d ed. 2005). A sixteen-week fetus is approximately twelve centimeters
long from crown to rump; a twenty-week fetus measures approximately sixteen centimeters
along the same dimension, and a twenty-four-week fetus—that is, a fetus on the borderline
of viability—has a crown-to-rump length of approximately twenty-three centimeters. Id. at
80. Thus, depending on the size and gestational age of the fetus, it could be largely within
the vaginal canal.
81
82

See supra text accompanying notes 34–51.

See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007) (Carhart II) (noting that the
two lower court trials lasted two weeks and three weeks, respectively); id .at 189–90
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the record contains “hundreds and hundreds of pages”
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Indeed, the Court’s substitution of “body” for “vagina” is an odd
synecdoche. Here, the uterus comes to stand for the woman as a whole and
its border, the cervix, stands for the outer edge of her body.83 Moreover, the
Court has seemingly designated everything beyond the cervix, including the
birth canal itself, as public, not belonging to the woman but outside of her,
and therefore as properly subject to regulation. This image resonates with
the Court’s assertion of its own authority to “draw[] boundaries to prevent
certain practices that extinguish life and are close to actions that are
condemned”—even, apparently, when the boundaries are within the
woman’s body.84 Thus, the vagina, like the woman herself, is either absent
from the Court’s field of vision, or, more likely, the vagina is missing from
the discourse on what takes place within the woman’s body because the
vagina is not part of that body—it is a separate entity that is eminently
public rather than profoundly private.85
A final feature of the Court’s discourse that bears noting is its
repeated invocation of “anatomical landmarks,” a term which, unlike the
phrase “outside the body,” does not appear in the PBABA legislation
itself.86 This term also did not appear in Stenberg, but it was used in the
lower courts and appears to have been adopted from the Government’s
briefs.87 The Court uses the medical term “anatomical landmarks” to refer
to the part of the fetal body beyond which the fetus must be removed in
of medical evidence); see generally Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 852–1001 (D.
Neb. 2004) (summarizing massive amounts of medical evidence presented at trial in the
lower court); id. at 852 (noting that twenty-three physician witnesses testified at the PBABA
trial).
83
Cf. Cornell, supra note 63, at 347, 350 (discussing the reduction of woman to
her womb and to the maternal function in abortion law).
84

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 158.

85
Interestingly, Alan Hyde has characterized the vagina in precisely this way,
although his analysis draws on Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure case law rather than
abortion jurisprudence: “[T]he vagina, as Freudians would predict, is often constructed as a
lack, a gap, empty, an absence,” he explains, and “as a fetishized body part separate from the
body”; the vagina, moreover, is “the least private, most specularized” body part, one which
is “uniquely searchable.” HYDE, supra note 3, at 165.
86
87

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 148–56.

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1178 (9th Cir.
2006) (referencing the Government’s argument regarding “the use of a ‘specific anatomic
landmark’” in the PBABA statute); Brief of Petitioners, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood
Fed’n, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-1382), 2006 WL 2282123 at *11, *31–33, *37.
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order to trigger the prohibitions of the Act; in other words, the Act
criminalizes an abortion only if the fetus has been removed “from the body
of the mother” while intact up to a certain point, such as up to the head if
the fetus has a vertex (head-first) presentation, or past the fetus’s navel if
the fetus is breech (feet-first).88 The term “anatomical landmark,” then,
seems to refer to these important locations on the fetal body, but in a sense
it also refers to the woman’s body, since those anatomical parts of the fetus
must be past a particular anatomical part of the woman’s body—the cervix.
Thus, the Court’s language again casts the body as a geographic space,
punctuated by “landmarks.” But as with the phrase “outside the body,” the
Court’s use of the term “anatomical landmark” also highlights the fact that
the new line that the Court has drawn in Gonzales v. Carhart—a line
demarcating activity that can be criminalized from that which cannot—was
not drawn at viability, as it always has been since Roe v. Wade,89 but rather
at a place inside the woman’s body.90 As Justice Ginsburg argued in her
dissent, the Court seems to be blurring the line between pre- and postviability fetuses by drawing the line of legality not based “on whether a
fetus can survive outside the womb, but on where a fetus is anatomically
located when a particular medical procedure is performed.”91
From this close reading of the Court’s language in Gonzales v.
Carhart, three primary themes emerge. The first and most obvious is
disappearance: the woman disappears from the scene and provides merely a
backdrop for the drama that occurs inside her. She herself has no
personhood, no sacred self,92 no corporeality.93 Her vagina is absent, for all
intents and purposes, and even her cervix is arguably but a “landmark.” She
88

Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 148.

89

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

90

Id. at 163–64; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,

846 (1992).
91

Roe, 410 U.S. at 186 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). According to Justice Ginsburg,
the Court also blurred this line by suggesting that the fetus is “a living organism while in the
womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.” Id.
92

Cf. McClain, supra note 4, at 195 (noting that “notions of sacredness and
sanctity undergird the legal protection of inviolability . . . in the contexts of bodily integrity
and personal autonomy”).
93

Cf. HYDE, supra note 3, at 87–88 (observing that privacy jurisprudence
constructs the body as an abstract entity of personhood and bearer of rights); Thomas, supra
note 63, at 1459–60 (critiquing the primacy of personhood interests over interests in
corporeal integrity in privacy jurisprudence).
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is constructed as the geographic terrain on which the drama between the
fetus and the doctor plays out.
The second theme is dismemberment. The semi-autonomous fetus,
which “assum[es] the human form,”94 is brutally murdered as the largely
irrelevant, verbally absent woman stands by and provides the backdrop for
this horrific act. Constructing the woman’s body as the backdrop for such a
criminal act seems to justify, if not call for, surveillance and regulation. The
Court, Congress, and even the reader cannot be expected to passively accept
the repetition of this crime, even if the woman, constructed at best as a
victim herself,95 does so.96
Yet the destruction and dismemberment of the fetus, so graphically
described, also afflict the woman herself. Indeed, it is perhaps inevitable
that such a detailed description of the abortion procedure taking place
within the woman’s body would result in a verbal fragmentation of the
woman that reduces her to the various elements of her reproductive
anatomy. Those elements of her anatomy are not even attributed
specifically to her but instead labeled “the cervix,” “the uterus,” and so on.
She is thus just a collection of pieces, not unified into one whole person or
woman to whom those pieces can be said to belong. Indeed, Drucilla
Cornell has described the denial of the right to abortion in general as an
assault on women’s bodily integrity and therefore as “a symbolic
dismemberment of a woman’s body,” but this turn of phrase has perhaps
never had such obvious and literal application until the Court’s opinion in
Gonzales.97
Finally, the Court’s language displaces the boundaries of the
woman’s body. It renders completely public even those body parts one
might think of as profoundly private. In this sense, too, the woman’s body
lacks integrity in the sense that the law, not the woman herself, controls its
very borders—the divide between what is inside and outside the body,

94

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 160 (2007) (Carhart II).

95

Id. at 159–60 (imagining the post-abortion “grief” and “sorrow” that the woman
would experience upon discovering the nature of the intact D&E procedure).
96
97

Perhaps, then, the woman lacks “integrity” in the moral sense as well.

Cornell, supra note 63, at 342; see also Christyne L. Neff, Woman, Womb, and
Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 327, 327–28 (1991) (arguing that American
privacy jurisprudence “allows the state to conceptually sever [the woman’s] womb” and
advocating for an approach to reproductive rights that centers on bodily integrity).
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between what is private and what is publicly exposed.98 If the Court
constructs her vagina as somehow “outside the body,” and if her cervix and
uterus become, generically, “the cervix” and “the uterus,” then they cannot
belong to her in the sense that our private bodies belong to us.99 At a
minimum, women’s bodies become validly subject to regulation by the
state. To return to the dichotomy presented at the beginning of this
Article,100 the Court’s language firmly pushes the body out of the domain of
the private, that which is most sacred and intimate and tied to personhood,
and into the domain of regulation, control, and state power. It therefore not
only resonates with but also justifies the increasingly intense government
regulation of the abortion procedure.
All three of these themes—disappearance, dismemberment, and
displacement of boundaries—are, moreover, united by the uniquely visual
(or graphic)101 style that animates the Court’s rhetoric. The graphic quality
of the Court’s description of the intact D&E procedure is evidence of the
Court’s strongly visual orientation.
The mechanism of sight draws to mind a number of associations,
many of which dovetail with the motifs that this Article has identified in
Gonzales’ rhetoric. Peter Brooks, for example, has explained that seeing
and observing are not merely passive but at times aggressive endeavors;
they may imply hostility and objectification.102 The gaze, as discussed in
literary and cultural theory, is often fragmenting and dismembering,
particularly when it focuses on the female body.103 The verbal
fragmentation that characterizes the Court’s “descriptive prose” in Gonzales
is perhaps “inherent to vision itself,” caused “in cinema, [by] the movement
98

Cf. Cornell, supra note 63, at 362 (emphasizing that bodily integrity includes the
ability to protect the boundary between what is inside and outside the body and to control
what is publicly exposed); Neff, supra note 97, at 350 (describing denial of an abortion as
“the state [entering] the woman’s body, seiz[ing] control, and establish[ing] an adversarial
relationship between the woman and her womb”).
99
Cf. McClain, supra note 4, at 202 (describing privacy and bodily integrity as
“self-belonging”); see generally Stychin, supra note 1, at 223–24.
100

See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.

101
The etymology of the word “graphic,” after all, relates to the idea of a drawing
or picture as well as a writing.
102

PETER BROOKS, BODY WORK: OBJECTS OF DESIRE IN MODERN NARRATIVE 89–90

(1993).
103
Id. at 92–93 (discussing the fragmented, metonymizing gaze of the narrator in
19th-century realist fiction).
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of the camera and of bodies in and out of the space it frames” and “in
literature, [by] the linear nature of the signifier, which means that an image
or idea cannot be presented at once but must rather unfold in sentences.”104
Indeed, Alan Hyde has noted, in discussing the public indecency case
United States v. Biocic,105 that the court’s verbally “breaking up” of a
woman’s body into parts “emphasizes the viewpoint of the gazer (with
power) that homes in on particular parts of the body, in a kind of visual
fetishism in which ‘the historically unnameable parts of the female body
come to stand for the rest of it.’”106
Yet the gaze may also be associated with the death or disappearance
of the body it holds: “[s]till photography may be the one exercise of vision
in which the body can be held as a whole, because it is held motionless:
which may suggest why . . . it has a particular kinship with death. The
photographic gaze can see the body whole only by killing it.”107 Like most
visual representations, the Court’s description is also distancing and
objectifying: “[f]or sight, in contrast to the other senses, has as its peculiar
property the capacity for detachment, for objectifying the thing visualized
by creating distance between knower and known.”108 This objectifying
aspect of vision, too, may be associated with the ultimate passivity of the
object viewed. Vision may simply reinforce the perspective, the subjective

104

Id. at 102.

105

928 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1991).

106

HYDE, supra note 3, at 133–34 (quoting HELENA MICHIE, THE FLESH MADE
WORD: FEMALE FIGURES AND WOMEN’S BODIES 141 (1987)). See generally Amy Adler,
Performance Anxiety: Medusa, Sex, and the First Amendment, ,21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 227,
246-47 (2009) (discussing visual fetishism in the Medusa myth and its relationship to anxiety
about female sexuality).
107

BROOKS, supra note 102, at 102. The gaze is also associated with both death
and dismemberment in the Medusa myth. As interpreted by Sigmund Freud, the myth of
Medusa—who turned men to stone when they looked at her—represents the male fear of
castration evoked by the sight of the female genitalia, which is in a sense already “castrated”
in the Freudian narrative. Adler, supra note 106, at 238–242. Medusa was killed by Perseus,
who looked at her through the reflection of his shield and was thereby able to back up and
behead her by using her reflection as a guide. Id. at 240. The Medusa myth has been
interpreted by feminist scholars to suggest that according to this mythology, women must be
placed in their proper role as object, not subject, of the gaze, id. at 248–250. It is noteworthy
that Medusa’s assumption of the role of visual object (in the reflection in Perseus’ shield) is
closely associated, temporally and causally, with her own death.
108

Petchesky, supra note 48, at 275.
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agency of the gazer rather than the presence of the gazed-upon.109 Finally,
vision is closely associated with the transgression or displacement of
borders, particularly the border between the public and the private. One
may think of the voyeur’s gaze as it violates the privacy taken for granted
by its object. Of course, that privacy is most often associated with sexual
modesty, the imperative of keeping the most sexual body parts hidden. It is
precisely those sexual body parts that are implicated in the Court’s
description and, in a sense, thrown open to public view. The themes of
dismemberment, disappearance, and displacement of borders thus arise
from the graphic, visual nature of the Court’s prose.
III. GRAPHIC LANGUAGE AND REGULATORY POWER
The final Section of this Article considers briefly what might be
behind the Court’s unusual and troubling language in Gonzales v.
Carhart.110 In particular, this Section attempts to provide an explanation as
to why the Court chose the language it did and what, if anything, we can
conclude from Gonzales’ rhetoric about the future of abortion jurisprudence
in the Supreme Court.
First, however, it must be acknowledged that not all aspects of the
Court’s language described above are unique to Justice Kennedy’s opinion
in Gonzales. This Article has focused on that specific opinion because it is
the most recent and most jurisprudentially important pronouncement on
abortion rights in the United States. In addition, the Supreme Court
exercises a unique influence on our culture, arguably helping to shape the
ways in which individuals view the sorts of hot-button social issues it
addresses.111 But as explained above, some of the Court’s terminology may
be found in lower court cases and older Supreme Court cases, and some of
it has been culled from briefs and from the challenged statute itself.112
Perhaps most troublingly, it seems that the Court has at times adopted the
anti-abortion rhetoric that has often dominated public discourse surrounding

109
Cf. Brooks, supra note 102, at 90–91 (describing how the gaze may truly
“reflect the observer” rather than the object of observation).
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550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Carhart II).
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See generally Robert C. Post, Foreword, Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (arguing that “constitutional law
both arises from and in turn regulates culture”).

112 See supra notes 64‐87 and accompanying text.
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the use of the intact D&E procedure.113 But to recognize that the Supreme
Court’s language in Gonzales is often borrowed is not to deny the fact that
language was chosen by its author, nor is it to deny the power of that
language to construct a particular reality.
Moreover, it is not clear that the disturbing nature of the intact
D&E procedure can or should be explained away, papered over, or
domesticated for the reader. It does not serve the pro-choice cause to
pretend that abortion, particularly late-term abortion, is not a morally
fraught, often tragic event. The fact that it is often necessary does not mean
that its complexities should go unacknowledged.114
It nonetheless seems worthwhile to ask what the reader is to make
of the graphic language of Gonzales. In particular, how can the challenging
rhetoric of this case be contextualized and given significance within the
body of abortion jurisprudence? Many of the themes that this Article has
uncovered in the Court’s Gonzales rhetoric, after all, are not entirely new.
Feminist critics have long noted the disappearance of the woman in
abortion law and rhetoric, as well as the ways in which abortion regulation
tends to render the borders of the female body permeable and violable and
to turn the private body into a public space subject to government control.115
Yet it is hard to think of a case in which those themes were more
dramatically and graphically represented by the Court’s rhetoric than in
Gonzales.
But what further sets Gonzales apart is its uniquely visual character.
The driving perspective of the Court’s opinion is the visual one, a
perspective that has arguably come to dominate the abortion rights
debate.116 For example, as Carol Sanger has observed, fetal imagery is a
ubiquitous but relatively recent phenomenon that has nonetheless virtually
taken center stage in the political debate over abortion.117 The dominance of
the visual may be related to the dramatic improvements in medical
technology in general and reproductive technology specifically, which have,
according to Professor Carol Smart, increased the field of medical and legal
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intervention in women’s bodies, ever finding new body parts and functions
that can be subject to regulation.118
Indeed, the faculty of sight is also in some ways a symbol of
modern regulatory power. For Michel Foucault, the acts of seeing and
observing are forms of knowing and therefore dominating the body.119 The
figure of the panopticon, discussed above, represents for Foucault micromanagement, intensive regulation, and social control of individuals and
their bodies.120 It is a space in which bodies can be subordinated without the
use of actual physical violence or confrontation. Much as the Court’s
language in Gonzales figuratively dismembers and murders the woman’s
body and opens the door in multiple ways for even more intrusive
regulation of the abortion procedure, the Court has turned women’s bodies
into an object of state regulation and even physical harm without violence
or even the threat of violence—indeed, without even imposing criminal
sanctions on the women themselves.121 Moreover, the panopticon is a form
of observation and control that is “democratically controlled,” thereby
allowing the exercise of power on the individual to be “supervised by
society as a whole”—represented here by the federal legislative branch.122
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CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 96–97 (1989). Professor
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Id. at 203. Indeed, Foucault also points out that the panopticon functions as a
sort of laboratory, “a privileged place for experiments on men.” Id. at 204. One might argue
that the Court’s decision in Gonzales even submits women’s bodies to a form of medicolegal experimentation: the Court’s holding that the medical reasons for seeking the intact
D&E procedure must be tested on an as-applied basis, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
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which real women will suffer while courts determine the constitutional applications of the
federal law.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed in some detail the Supreme Court’s
language in Gonzales v. Carhart123 and attempted to draw from that
language some common themes, demonstrating how the concepts of
disappearance, dismemberment, and displacement of boundaries organize
the Court’s construction of the female body. All of these thematic elements,
which are largely consequences of the Court’s graphic, visual rhetoric,
combine to justify intense regulation of the abortion procedure. This type of
intense regulation is perhaps best exemplified by the “partial-birth” abortion
ban itself, but it may also be observed in other abortion regulations, such as
mandatory ultrasound requirements, exacting and intrusive legislative or
administrative regulation of abortion providers (so-called TRAP laws), and
extensive informed consent requirements.124 Given the Supreme Court’s
approach in Gonzales, there is every reason to believe that this degree of
regulation is here to stay.
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